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Default, Framing and Spillover Effects:  
The Case of Lifecycle Funds in 401(k) Plans  
 
I.  Introduction 
 Default options and framing techniques have both emerged as useful strategies for 
remedying numerous apparent deficiencies in individual decision-making.  For example, in the 
case of U.S. defined contribution (DC) plans, the U.S. Treasury in 1997 introduced an opt-out or 
automatic enrollment regime in an effort to boost worker retirement saving. This design change 
dramatically improved saving by low-wage and younger workers.  The success of automatic 
enrollment has in turn prompted a broader discussion of the role that "choice architecture" might 
play in optimizing decisions in other domains, such as the environment, consumer protection, 
and health care (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
Following on this earlier success, the U.S. Department of Labor in 2007 sanctioned a new 
class of default investments for DC retirement plans (known as qualified default investment 
alternatives or QDIAs) under the Pension Protection Act. The aim of this new policy was to 
improve portfolio allocations among defaulted participants. One popular type of QDIA, known 
as lifecycle or target maturity funds, are pension investment options that radically simplify 
portfolio allocation decisions.1  With a lifecycle investment offering, plan participants select a 
portfolio based only on an expected year of retirement. The fund’s portfolio manager is 
responsible for all portfolio construction decisions, including initial allocations, daily rebalancing 
and portfolio changes over the lifecycle. When offered on a voluntary (non-automatic) basis, 
lifecycle funds might be expected to appeal to individuals with little or no experience with 
                                                 
1 In this paper we reserve the term “lifecycle fund” for the lifecycle concept. The term "lifecycle" is sometimes 
broadened to include risk-based static allocation (SA) funds, such as conservative, moderate or aggressive funds.  
SA funds are increasingly referred to as “lifestyle” funds.  
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portfolio allocation decisions – we refer to this as the investment framing effect, as it reframes a 
complex portfolio choice decision as a simpler one. When these are designated by the plan 
sponsor as a default investment, lifecycle funds would be expected to alter portfolio allocations 
because of inertia – a default effect.  But as we show in this paper, default and framing effects 
are an incomplete account of the behavioral impact of changing the “choice architecture” in 
retirement plans. Drawing on a rich dataset of nearly a quarter-million 401(k) participants 
covered by over 250 plans in a variety of default and voluntary choice settings, we find that the 
introduction of lifecycle funds also produces an unexpected result: it prompts the growth of a 
sizeable new class of investors which uses these funds in unanticipated ways. This unanticipated 
change in behavior we refer to as a “spillover” effect. 
Our paper builds on an important literature regarding default effects in retirement plans, 
particularly with respect to savings decisions (Madrian and Shea, 2001; Choi et al., 2003, 2005, 
2006; Nessmith, Utkus and Young, 2007).  It also builds upon an extensive body of literature on 
portfolio allocation and trading choices, both in retirement plans and personal accounts 
(O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 2001; Benartzi, 2001; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002; Ameriks 
and Zeldes, 2004; Agnew, Balduzzi, and Sunden, 2003; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus, and 
Yamaguchi, 2006a and 2006b; Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007; Calvet, Campbell and Sodini, 
2009).  We also draw directly from earlier findings that retirement plan investment menus frame 
individual portfolio allocation decisions in sizeable ways, either as a result of inertia or naïve 
decision-making (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002; Huberman and Jiang, 2006; Brown, Liang 
and Weisbenner; 2006) or in reaction to excessive complexity, also known as “choice overload” 
(Iyengar, Huberman and Jiang, 2004; Iyengar and Jiang, 2006). Two of these studies (Benartzi, 
2001; Choi et. al., 2003) demonstrate similar unintended consequences among individuals who 
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are affected by default designations.  But our results offer a more expansive understanding of the 
effects of changes in decision architectures. As with prior studies, we confirm that default and 
framing effects reshape individual choices and help explain many behavioral effects. But these 
factors do not account for the full range of outcomes: indeed, as we show here, large unexpected 
or spillover effects arise among individuals making voluntary choices, and in the case of 
lifecycle funds, the latter can be as significant as the original intended default effects.  
In what follows, we begin by describing our dataset and the rich complexity that arises 
with the introduction of lifecycle funds in 401(k) plans. The empirical approach first considers 
models of lifecycle fund adoption; next we analyze the impact that such adoption has on 
portfolio characteristics.  We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for 
retirement policy and more broadly for models of behaviorally-influenced decision-making.   
 
II.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To assess how the introduction of lifecycle funds affects 401(k) decision-making, we 
investigate a unique panel dataset covering 258 defined contribution plans drawn from 
Vanguard’s 401(k) recordkeeping system. The full sample used to explore adoption patterns 
includes over 252,000 active participants in plans that introduced lifecycle funds during 2003-05; 
all participants entering and leaving the plans due to normal workforce turnover are included in 
the full sample.2 Variables available for empirical analysis include a wealth of detail on 401(k) 
account balances, investment holdings, and account contributions,3 as well as key socioeconomic 
                                                 
2 Active 401(k) participants are those who are currently contributing to their employer’s retirement plan.  
3 We focus our portfolio analysis on 401(k) contributions rather than fund balances because contributions are more 
reflective of forward-looking intentions and unbiased by prior holdings.   
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characteristics including age, sex, household income, and non-retirement financial wealth.4  Also 
available are important features about each plan’s offered investment menu, including the 
number and types of investment funds offered and other plan design details. In addition, our 
dataset includes monthly returns for all investments offered over an eight-year period (including 
the three-year period under analysis as well as the five years preceding it).  
Table 1 outlines the key attributes of the lifecycle funds introduced by our employers 
over the period under study. Each lifecycle fund is named according to its target maturity date; 
each involves a different mix of passively-managed US equity (including large-, mid- and small-
capitalization stocks), international equity (both developed and emerging markets), and US high-
quality bonds. Panel A indicates that total equity exposure in the funds for the younger 
participants averages 89 percent (in the 2035 and 2045 Funds) versus 29 percent for older 
participants in the Income Fund intended for those in their 60s and beyond. Panel B of Table 2 
depicts how the lifecycle funds were introduced.  In 45 percent of the plans lifecycle funds were 
introduced de novo while in 55 percent of the plans, the participants had been previously offered 
static allocation (SA) or risk-based funds. In this latter group, one set of plans added lifecycle 
funds to a menu that included pre-existing SA funds, while the other group switched or 
“mapped” the plans from SA to lifecycle funds.5 Finally, in some cases, the employer designated 
the new lifecycle funds as the plan default. The default option influences mainly new hires who 
are automatically enrolled (or who enroll on a voluntary basis but failed to submit an investment 
election with their enrollment).  
                                                 
4 Household income is imputed based on zip codes as is non-retirement financial wealth, and is provided by the IXI 
Company.   
5 In the case of mapping from SA to lifecycle funds, sponsors could either switch all participant SA balances and 
contributions into the new lifecycle funds, or allow existing balances to remain undisturbed while switching future 
contributions into lifecycle funds.  In both cases, the new lifecycle allocations would reflect the sponsor’s decision 
to move the money, rather than representing an active employee election.   
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Table 1 here 
Table 2 summarizes characteristics of the plans and covered workers.  There is 
substantial diversity by age, income, 401(k) account balance, and non-retirement financial wealth 
in our full sample (Column 1).  Nearly one-fifth are new hires.  The mean 401(k) balance is just 
over $64,000. 
Table 2 here   
From this aggregate sample, we draw a group of lifecycle adopters for use in a 
difference-in-difference (D-D) analysis of portfolio effects. This subset consists of lifecycle 
adopters who were continuously employed in our panel during the 2003-2005 period; in other 
words, it excludes new hires.  Because default designations in our sample overwhelmingly apply 
only to new hires, this group excludes defaulted new hires, and only consists of participants who 
voluntarily chose lifecycle funds once they were introduced into their 401(k) plans. Comparing 
these lifecycle participants with the full sample (Columns 1 and 2), we see that (non-defaulted) 
lifecycle adopters tend to be younger, more female, and earn less than the full sample; they also 
have lower 401(k) balances. 
Lifecycle funds by their nature are intended as a single or complete portfolio.  In keeping 
with this intent, almost half (n = 10,750 or 44 percent) of those in the D-D sample are “pure” 
adopters and direct their entire contributions to lifecycle funds (Column 3).  The remainder of the 
adopters (n = 13,862 or 56%) utilize lifecycle funds in an unexpected way: they contribute to 
lifecycle funds along with other investment options in their portfolio (Column 4).6  Pure (non-
default) adopters are younger and more female compared to mixed (non-default) adopters, and 
                                                 
6Over 95% of pure adopters contribute to only one lifecycle fund; mixed adopters contribute to 4.5 funds on 
average.  
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they have lower 401(k) balances and non-retirement financial wealth. By comparison, mixed 
(non-default) adopters tend to be older, more affluent males.   
 
III.  Factors Influencing the Adoption of Lifecycle Funds 
 Retirement plan participants may come to invest in lifecycle funds in a variety of ways.  
First, the employer may designate the lifecycle funds as a default investment.  As a result, 
participants who are automatically enrolled (or who voluntarily decide to contribute but fail to 
submit an investment election) are directed by design into an appropriate age-based fund, thus 
eliciting a so-called default effect. Second, lifecycle funds may be offered to participants on a 
voluntary (non-default) basis.  The lifecycle funds examined here add neither new asset classes 
nor investment management styles to the retirement plans we examine.  As a result, participants 
electing them on a non-default basis would presumably be doing so because the funds simplify 
the portfolio allocation decision – what we refer to as the investment framing effect.  But third, 
in the voluntary choice setting that characterizes 401(k) investment decision-making, participants 
may choose to invest in lifecycle funds using a more complex portfolio strategy, combining them 
with other plan investments.  This is the unintended spillover effect.  
 To assess the factors associated with each of these three outcomes—default, framing and 
spillover effects—we begin with a straightforward Probit analysis of lifecycle fund adoption.  In 
equation (1), LCAdopteri,j,t refers to the probability that the ith participant holds a lifecycle fund 
in the jth plan in month t as follows: 
tjijtitji TREATMENTβPLANTPARTICIPANLCAdopter ,,,,      (1) 
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where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the participant invests in a lifecycle fund in 
month t, and 0 otherwise. The mean value of this time-weighted adoption rate is 15.1%.7  For 
this analysis we use the full data (as described in Table 2), which includes both continuously 
employed participants as well as new hires entering the plan for the first time. The 
PARTICIPANT vector includes a New Entrant identifier indicating whether the participant 
entered the plan after the lifecycle funds were offered (0 otherwise). The TREATMENT vector 
measures aspects associated with the way in which lifecycle funds were introduced: for instance, 
a Default indicator indicates whether the new lifecycle funds were designated as the default 
investment option. We also interact Default and New Entrant to reveal the effect of new plan 
entrants being defaulted into the lifecycle funds.8  In addition, we control on the number of 
months since lifecycle funds were introduced, Time Count (and that same variable squared), to 
indicate the time path of impact of lifecycle adoption.  The model also incorporates participant 
socioeconomic characteristics including age, income, sex, and non-retirement financial wealth. 
To control on cross-plan differences, the PLAN vector indicates the number of fund choices on 
offer, a dummy indicating company stock is available in the 401(k) plan, and an indicator of loan 
availability. For reasons noted above, we also control on SA_Before which indicates whether 
static allocation funds had been previously offered.9  
                                                 
7 The mean value of lifecycle adoption is not 10% (in Table 1, 24,612 lifecycle adopters divided by 252,980 
participants) because our measure is weighted according to the months in which lifecycle funds were offered.  For 
example, if lifecycle funds were offered in a given plan during 18 months of our analysis period, and a participant in 
that plan contributed to those funds over nine months, his adoption rate would be 50%. 
8 Not all new entrants are new hires.  Many of the plans in our sample allow immediate eligibility for the plan to 
new hires though a minority imposes a six- or twelve-month waiting period.   
9 The econometric models correct for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( i ), time fixed effects ( t ), and industry fixed 
effects, along with missing data controls. 
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 Table 3 reports estimated coefficients and marginal effects for the Probit regression.  The 
most prominent finding is the strength of the default effect: if an employer designates lifecycle 
funds as the default investment, the likelihood of participants adopting the funds surges by 10.9 
percentage points, an increase of 66% in the mean adoption rate.  (This might be called the “PPA 
effect,” a measure of how much participation in lifecycle funds rises as a result of employers’ 
decisions to designate lifecycle funds as plan default investments under the 2006 Pension 
Protection Act.) The default effect for new participants is even higher, indicating that newly 
eligible employees are 14.5 percentage points more likely to elect lifecycle funds when the 
employer offers these as the default investment.  
Table 3 here 
While the default effect is strong, lifecycle funds also prove to attract participants making 
voluntary choices.  This framing effect is quite powerful among new hires: even when the fund is 
not the default, new hires are still 6.6 percentage points more likely to adopt lifecycle funds.  In 
addition, lifecycle funds are also more likely to be adopted by participants with characteristics 
typically associated with low levels of financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007).  In our 
regression results, young and female participants, as well as those with low 401(k) balances and 
low levels of non-financial retirement wealth, are more likely to invest in lifecycle funds on a 
voluntary (non-default) basis. With their ultra-simple decision framework, lifecycle funds 
eliminate the need to make complex portfolio construction decisions.   
Two other subtleties are associated with the framing effects of lifecycle funds.  Voluntary 
adoption of the funds appears to evolve linearly with time, such that each month following the 
introduction of the funds boosts adoption rates by 0.4 points.  In other words, the framing effect 
becomes more attractive to participants with time.  Also offering more funds in the 401(k) menu 
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slightly reduces participation in lifecycle funds.  The effect is small (having 10 additional funds 
means a two percentage point lower chance of holding lifecycle funds) but it does suggest that 
the appeal of lifecycle funds is contingent on the breadth of the other investment offerings.   
The results summarized in Table 3 combine pure investors (adopting only a single 
lifecycle fund) with mixed investors (combining lifecycle funds with other investments).  These 
mixed investors are evidence of our unintended or second-order spillover effect. To further 
disentangle differences between pure versus mixed lifecycle adopters, Table 4 reports marginal 
effects calculated from a multinomial Logit model where the dependent variable equals 1 if the 
participant is a mixed adopter; 2 if he is a pure adopter; and 0 if he is a nonadopter (the reference 
group). The explanatory variables are the same as in the prior Probit model. Measured on a time-
weighted adoption basis, there are somewhat more pure adopters (8.6 percent of the sample) 
versus mixed (7.7 percent).   
Table 4 here 
For the pure investors, we see a default effect similar in magnitude to the prior Probit 
model: the default designation raises adoption by 5 points on a time-weighted adoption rate base 
of 8.6 percent, or 58 percent on a relative basis. The framing effects for pure investors are also 
similar: new entrants are more likely to be pure adopters, as are young, female, low income, low 
401(k) balance and low non-retirement wealth participants.  The prevalence of pure adoption 
also rises over time. By contrast, mixed adopters are unlike pure adopters along a number of 
dimensions: for instance, they are less influenced by the plan's default fund designation 
compared to pure adopters. Also the impact of the default designation on new hires is actually 
negative: new hires who are defaulted are more likely to be pure adopters and less likely to be 
mixed adopters. Demographically, mixed investors are likely to be younger and female, but 
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relatively less so than pure adopters. Moreover, they tend to be middle income and middle-
wealth participants compared to non-adopters. Mixed investors, in other words, do not appear to 
possess the types of demographic characteristics or default behavior typically associated with 
low levels of financial sophistication. It is true that they could simply be a group of middle-
income and middle-wealth participants plagued by naïve diversification, combining lifecycle 
funds with other options at random (Benartzi and Thaler, 2001).  But another possibility is that 
they are engaged in a more sophisticated approach to investing.10  Additional survey research is 
needed to elicit the types of motivations driving the construction of these mixed portfolio 
strategies.  But at least from our data set, we can ascertain that the motivations, whether rational 
or naïve, are disproportionately linked to middle-income and middle-wealth participants.   
In sum, introducing lifecycle accounts have differential default and framing effects across 
pension plan participants.  Altering the 401(k) choice architecture generates both intended and 
unintended consequences: default and framing effects are statistically and economically 
meaningful among pure investors, but the spillover effect is sizeable and results in the creation of 
a new class of mixed investors. 
 
IV.  Portfolio Changes Arising from the Introduction of Lifecycle Funds 
We turn next to an assessment of how participant portfolios respond to changes in the 
choice architecture of 401(k) plans.  Life cycle funds are structured so that portfolio risk levels 
decline with age following a so-called "equity glide path": younger participants intending to 
retire further in the future will have a higher equity fraction and less fixed income, while older 
                                                 
10 For example, mixed adopters may only want to have a portion of their portfolio to be automatically rebalanced, or 
they may be engaging in a “core/satellite” strategy of having the lifecycle fund as a core holding, supplemented by 
satellite funds.  
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investors in these age-linked funds would hold less risky portfolios.  In a rational agents’ world, 
we would not expect the introduction of lifecycle funds to alter the age structure of equity 
allocations. But if participants are swayed by default and framing and spillover effects, we might 
expect that lifecycle funds will alter the equity gradient among participants.  It is also worth 
noting that the lifecycle funds in our sample are passive or index-based, and the participants in 
our sample could have accessed a broad-based market index portfolio on their own, separate 
from the lifecycle funds.  As a result, in a world in which 401(k) decision-makers are unduly 
influenced by behavioral biases, we might anticipate that the introduction of low-cost indexed 
lifecycle funds would reduce the share of idiosyncratic risk in portfolios.   
We use a difference-in-difference model to evaluate the impact of lifecycle fund adoption 
on portfolio characteristics.  Since we must observe a "before” portfolio (before lifecycle funds 
were introduced), as well as an “after” portfolio, we omit new entrants and hence new workers 
who were directly defaulted into lifecycle funds.  For this reason, our difference-in-difference 
analysis is based on the subset of approximately 25,000 participants who adopted a lifecycle 
fund on a voluntary (non-default) basis, and focuses on framing and spillover (but not default) 
effects.  
Table 5 describes investment attributes of lifecycle adopter portfolios before and after 
lifecycle funds join the menu, specifically, one month prior to adoption (time t-1) and six months 
later (time t+6).11 Panel A summaries the allocation of participant contributions by major asset 
class including cash (money market or guaranteed investment contracts), bonds, balanced or 
lifecycle (and/or lifestyle) funds, US equities, employer stock, and international equities.  
                                                 
11 Because we observe participants six months after lifecycle funds are offered, both the full sample and subset of 
adopters include only plans which introduced lifecycle funds by 6/05.  The lifecycle adopter subset has 7 fewer 
plans because these had no lifecycle adopters as of December 12/05. Of the 252,000 participants in the full dataset, 
189,968 were included in their plan both one month before and six months after the lifecycle funds were introduced.  
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Overall, lifecycle adopters held more cash, bonds, and equity funds before the introduction of the 
lifecycle funds; afterwards, their balanced and lifecycle holdings rises by 12 percent. It is also 
interesting that many lifecycle adopters contributed to balanced or static allocation funds before 
the new lifecycle funds were introduced; these funds account for 79 percent of pure adopters’ 
and 35 percent of mixed adopters’ contributions.  This finding points to the importance of 
controlling on the prior presence of the pre-existing menu design in order to evaluate the impact 
of lifecycle funds on participant behavior.  Pure lifecycle adopters cut their cash position by 
almost five percent and their pure US equity holdings by 11 percent, and increase by 21 percent 
their ownership of balanced funds; the impact is smaller for mixed lifecycle adopters. 
Table 5 here 
Panel B of Table 5 displays three portfolio attributes measured for lifecycle adopters, 
again on a pre/post basis. The first attribute is the percent of the portfolio held in equities,12 
where we see that, before the menu changed, the average lifecycle adopter directed two-thirds of 
his contributions to equities.  After the introduction of the lifecycle fund, equity allocations rise 
by 1.4 percent for all adopters, with pure adopters devoting somewhat less and mixed adopters 
somewhat more to equity. The second column of Panel B illustrates how participant portfolios 
change in terms of overall systematic or risk-adjusted return. A participant’s systematic return is 
the sum of the risk-free rate during the period, , and each participant’s factor return, or , 
derived from a three-factor asset pricing model.
fr
e
tir ,
13  The results show that expected returns rise 
                                                 
 
12 Equity allocation is equal to the percentage of contributions directed to US equity funds, international equity 
funds, company stock, and a percentage of balance/lifecycle funds.  The equity percentage for balanced/lifecycle 
funds was calculated based on each fund’s investment policies and varies from fund to fund. 
13 Factor returns are computed using a three-factor model based on US equities, US bonds, and international equities 
because, as noted earlier, the lifecycle funds in our dataset are composed of index-based funds mirroring these three 
asset classes.  To calculate portfolio returns we construct a risk-loading matrix for all k investment options in our 
dataset by regressing the excess return (over Treasury bill returns) for each of the k assets in our universe on three 
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across the board for all adopters as well as for pure and mixed adopters (before controlling on 
other factors including time effects; we say more on this below). Also the difference in expected 
returns between pure and mixed adopters is small.  For example, on a “before” basis, mixed 
adopters held 15 percent more equity than pure adopters (70.7 is 15 percent higher than 61.4), 
but their returns were only two percent higher (6.52  is two percent greater than 6.38).  This 
suggests that those who later become pure lifecycle investors had successfully constructed more 
efficient portfolios with lower equity exposure but similar expected returns, mainly through 
static allocation (lifestyle) and balanced fund holdings.14   
A third portfolio attribute reported in Table 3 is the ratio of idiosyncratic portfolio risk as 
a fraction of total portfolio variance, N 15./ ,tiTVSR  This measure describes how much of 
portfolio variance is explained by nonsystematic or non-market factors. By definition, 
nonsystematic risk should be zero when all of a participant’s contributions are directed to index-
 
market indices: the value-weighted CRSP portfolio, the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index (LBA), and the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE) Index.  The systematic return 
for each 401(k) investment option is simply its factor exposure times the average factor returns over the period; the 
participant’s factor return is simply the weighted average return of his or her factor exposures over the period. The 
mean returns of our three factors (CRPS, LBA and EAFE) over the 96-month period are given by: 
),,( ,,, tMSCIRFtLBARFtCRSPRFf rrrr  .  The systematic return associated with the kth asset is its factor exposure times 
the average factor returns over the 96 months, namely: fk
e
k rb
'



N
k
e
ktk
e
i rr
1
, tki ,,
r .  The ith participant’s excess return reported in 
Panel B of Table 3 is , where   is the weight of the kth fund in the ith participant’s 
contributions made in month t.   
 
14 Virtually all of the SA funds in our sample included broad exposure to US and international equities, as well as 
US bonds.  Many of the balanced funds did as well, although some were exclusively US-focused. 
15   We estimate the variance-covariance matrix for all assets .ˆ/ˆ/ , i
idio
itiTVNSR  ˆ , which in turn is used to 
estimate the total portfolio variance for the ith participant, .  , where is a diagonal matrix 
with elements computed as the square of the 
iˆ Df ˆˆˆˆˆ '  Dˆ
kˆ estimated in equation (2).  The asset variance can be decomposed 
into systematic risk,  and idiosyncratic risk .  Individual portfolio variance can be decomposed 
into its systematic and idiosyncratic component:  . 
 ˆˆ' f ˆˆ sys idio
sys
tkitki  ˆ(' ,,,, 
Dˆ
tki ˆ' ,, idioisysitki D  ˆˆˆˆ ,, iidio )
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based lifecycle funds. Not surprisingly, given that all of our funds are index-based, this measure 
of risk is eliminated for pure lifecycle adopters and it falls substantially for mixed adopters. 
In a multivariate analysis of portfolio effects, we examine factors associated with the 
same three portfolio characteristics, namely the individual’s allocation to equities, his systematic 
returns, and his nonsystematic risk. The dependent variables are represented in a vector of 
portfolio characteristics, PORTFOLIOi,j,t , , with the model taking the following form:   
TREATMENTβPLANTPARTICIPANPORTFOLIO tji  ,,
.,, tjijti
 
           (2) 
Model A includes just these terms, while Model B adds interaction terms to test whether specific 
groups display differential treatment patterns when lifecycle funds are introduced.  For example, 
LC_Treat*Young allows us to examine the differential impact of lifecycle treatment on 
participants under age 35.  
Table 6 summarizes estimates for the equity allocation models, differentiating results for 
pure and mixed adopters.  The variable LC_Treat in Model A captures the simple change in 
equity allocation after controlling for differences in participant and plan features, timing and 
industry fixed effects, and plan-level heteroskedasticity.  All else constant, pure adopters devote 
less to equity (1.8 percentage points) but no change is seen for mixed adopters.  Model B adds 
treatment interactions for participant and plan characteristics, the most important of which is 
with respect to age.  Here it is clear that for pure and mixed adopters, younger workers invest 
more in equity after lifecycle funds are introduced (LC_Treat + LC_Treat*Young), whereas 
middle-aged and older people reduce their equity share.  Figure 1 summarizes the age effects; the 
old-young difference increases by 8-10 percentage points.  It is also worth noting that the 
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changes in equity shares by age remains meaningful for mixed adopters, who on average direct 
one-third of their portfolio contributions to lifecycle funds.    
Table 6 and Figure 1 here 
Not only does the overall age variation in equity exposure change when lifecycle funds 
are introduced, but the distribution also becomes markedly less disperse (see Figure 2). 16   
Whereas many participants had previously held equity holdings at two focal points (0 and 100 
percent), and another group held a mid-range of equities (61-65 percent, a typical allocation in 
many balanced funds), adopters’ portfolios change dramatically after the new funds are offered. 
For pure adopters (Figure 2A), their revised equity holdings now concentrate around the key 
target percentages underlying the lifecycle fund offerings. For mixed adopters (Figure 2B), the 
zero and all-equity allocations are again mostly eliminated, though the changes are smaller.  
Overall the cross-sectional standard deviation of equity allocations is reduced.    
Figure 2 here 
Next we consider the impact of lifecycle fund introduction on portfolio efficiency 
measures.  As shown in the first two columns of Table 7, pure adopters can expect higher 
systematic returns of 19-21 basis points per year when they shift to an all-lifecycle portfolio.  
The change in the age gradient of equity allocations results in a change in age-related returns: 
young pure adopters see returns rise by an annualized 13 basis points (.0019-.0006), while older 
pure adopters can returns fall by 25 basis points (.0019+.0006) per year, partly due to their 
                                                 
16 Corresponding statistics measuring the dispersion of equity allocations are presented in the Appendix, both for 
plans offering the funds de novo or in substitute for static allocation funds. 
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having been shifted to more conservative allocations at older ages. 17   For mixed adopters, 
depicted in the next two columns of Table 7, changes in returns are not statistically significant.  
Table 7 here 
The second half of Table 7 indicates how portfolio nonsystematic risk shares (NSR) 
change when lifecycle funds are introduced. Not surprisingly, nonsystematic risk virtually 
disappears for pure adopters who switch their contributions to an all-index life cycle fund.  It 
accounted for 6 percentage points of total variance before lifecycle fund adoption and the 
marginal effect of shifting to lifecycle funds is a negative 5.1 percentage points.  The NSR share 
falls less for younger participants (-2.9 percentage points) than for older participants (-6.2 
percentage points).  Changes for mixed adopters are more notable: after moving to lifecycle 
funds, their NSR risk share declines by over 40 percent (a marginal effect of -8.3 on a mean of 
19.9 percentage points). Accordingly, even middle-income mixed adopters who use lifecycle 
funds for only portion of their portfolios will still experience a meaningful reduction in 
nonsystematic risk exposure.  In effect, we have another measure of the spillover effect: a 
reduction in idiosyncratic risk intended for the pure adopter spills over into a broader population 
of investors.  
These results highlight the power of framing effects on the structure of portfolio 
decisions.  For pure investors electing lifecycle funds on a voluntary basis, adopting the lifecycle 
offerings boosts equity exposure with age, eliminates extreme asset allocations, enhances 
portfolio efficiency, and reduces nonsystematic risk exposure. Our results also identify 
                                                 
17 Pure lifecycle investors generally liquidate cash investments and shift their fixed income to bonds. Cash 
investments have zero excess returns by definition, while over our study period, bonds earned excess returns of 23 
basis points per month. Our younger pure adopters moved from a cash exposure of 3% to 0% when moving to 
lifecycle funds, while older participants moved from 9% to 0%.  For mixed adopters, younger participants reduced 
equity holdings slightly, from 8% to 6%, while older participants moved from 11% to 9%.  
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meaningful and interesting spillover effects for mixed adopters, where introducing life cycle 
funds compresses the variability in equity holdings, reduces extreme allocations, and curtails 
nonsystematic risk – even when they do not move entirely into the lifecycle options. Spillover 
effects, in other words, extend beyond adoption outcomes to reshape portfolio risk and return 
characteristics.   
 
V.  Discussion  
Default, framing, and other behaviorally-based strategies have been proposed in several 
domains as a possible alternative to the need for enhanced consumer protection.  In the pension 
environment, this approach has prompted policy reforms including automatic enrollment and the 
creation of a new class of designated default investments for 401(k) plans.  Our paper considers 
whether default and framing effects are a sufficient explanation for the behavioral outcomes that 
arise from a change in the choice architecture.  We use the introduction of lifecycle funds into 
401(k) plans as a consequential decision-making environment for assessing this question.   
Our findings demonstrate that changes in a given choice architecture, while having 
expected default and framing effects, can also have important unanticipated or spillover effects. 
Specifically, we find, as anticipated, strong evidence of default and framing effects: adoption 
rates among pure investors, investing as intended in a single lifecycle fund, are nearly 60% 
higher when the funds are designated as a default investment option. Also, in voluntary (non-
default) settings, the funds are chosen by individuals with characteristics often associated with 
low levels of financial experience, namely young, low-income, and low-wealth investors.  
Because the lifecycle funds add no new asset classes to the retirement plans we examined, this 
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effect measures the appeal of the unique decision framing offered by a lifecycle fund—replacing 
the portfolio construction process with the choice of an expected retirement date.  
But the introduction of lifecycle funds also produces a large spillover effect, namely, the 
creation of a large group of mixed investors who utilize lifecycle funds in a more complex 
approach to retirement saving. While this was an unexpected result from lifecycle fund 
introduction, the effect is sizeable: the group of mixed investors is only slightly smaller than the 
pure investors. Moreover, "mixed" adopters are typically middle-income and middle-wealth 
investors, not characteristics typically associated with low levels of sophistication or naive 
diversification. The spillover effect does result in meaningful changes to these mixed adopter 
portfolios.  These include less extreme portfolio allocations, more age-based variation in equity 
exposure, and less idiosyncratic risk. 
These results are directly relevant for retirement policymakers and plan sponsors seeking 
to influence investment patterns in 401(k) plans. To the extent that the simplified framing of 
lifecycle funds appeals to participants with characteristics indicative of low financial 
sophistication, the designation of such funds as a default can markedly enhance portfolio 
allocations for the least-informed group. Also lifecycle funds have been proposed for the federal 
government employee Thrift Savings Plan, some state defined contribution schemes, and a 
defined contribution plan suggested for the US Social Security system.  Other countries such as 
Chile currently use lifecycle-type funds as the default in their national defined contribution 
systems.   
Our analysis also holds implication for "choice architects" in other domains seeking to 
remedy perceived deficiencies in individual decision-making with a range of behaviorally-
informed strategies.  While default and framing do have a powerful role in altering individual 
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behavior, these are an incomplete explanation of the impact of changing the decision 
environment.  Thus, when altering choice architectures, it is critical to understand the potential 
spillover effects that might occur, the magnitude of such effects, and whether their impact might 
be judged to be detrimental or benign.   
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Table 1.  Characteristics of Lifecycle Funds Introduced 
 
 
A. Portfolio Mix of Lifecycle Funds by Target Date  
US Equities Int'l Equities  US Bonds Equity Share
% %  %  % 
2045 Fund 71 18 11 89
2035 Fund 71 18 11 89
2025 Fund 63 16 21 79
2015 Fund 50 13 37 63
2005 Fund 35 9 56 44
Income Fund 24 5 71 29
 
 
 
 
 
B. Introduction Patterns of Lifecycle (LC) Funds  
 
  N %   N %   N %
1.  De Novo Life Cycle (LC) 117 0.45 113,560 0.45 3,541 0.14
2.  Added LC to SA 83 0.32 99,201 0.39 12,509 0.51
3.  Switch from SA to LC 58 0.22 40,219 0.16 8,562 0.35
Total 258  252,980 24,612
Plans Participants LC adopters
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Panel A tabulates asset mix as of 9/07.  Static allocation (SA) refer to prior risk-based funds; see text.  
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Table 2.  Participant and Plan Characteristics 
 
Difference-in-Difference Sample
Full Sample
All         
Adopters
Pure 
Adopters
Mixed 
Adopters
Variable 1 2 3
Age (%)
4
Young (< 35) 25 28 33 24
Middle (35-55) 59 59 55 62
Old (> 55) 16 13 12 13
Sex (%)
Male 45 41 31 49
Female 26 30 33 28
Missing 29 28 36 22
Income (%)
Low (< $62.5K) 19 23 25 21
Medium ($62.5-$87.5K) 39 39 44 36
High (> $87.5K) 41 38 30 43
Tenure (%)
New Hire 18 na na na
401(k) Balance ($ av.) 64,065 50,032 34,289 62,240
Non-ret. Financial Wealth (%)
Poor (< $7.3K) 42 41 44 39
Average ($7.3-$61K) 35 37 36 38
Rich (> $61K) 23 22 20 23
Plan Feature (% of participants)
Employer Stock Offered 31 26 na na
Loan Offered 67 62 na na
N Funds Offered (mean) 34.2 33.0 na na
Observations
N Plans 258                251              228              234              
N Participant Accounts 252,980       24,612       10,750        13,862         
 
Notes: 
1.  Characteristics are as of 12/5 for the full sample and six months after lifecycle introduction for the difference-in-
difference sample. 
2.  The difference-in-difference sample includes participants choosing lifecycle funds who were continuously 
employed during the sample period (i.e., new entrants are excluded). 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Table 3.  Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Probability of Being a Lifecycle (LC) Adopter 
(Dependent variable = 1 if Lifecycle Adopter, 0 else; mean = 15.1%) 
 
Mean Coefficient
Marginal 
Effects (%)
Lifecycle Treatment
Default (%) 11 0.565 *** 10.9
New Entrant*Default 0.189 *** 3.6
Mos Since LC 9.3 0.011 *** 0.2
Mos**2 Since LC 120.7 0.000 *** 0.0
Socioeconomic Factors  (%)
Young 23 0.121 *** 2.3
Old 16 -0.103 *** -2.0
Male 45 -0.067 *** -1.3
Low_Income 20 -0.029 *** -0.5
High_Income 40 -0.003 -0.1
Poor_Wealth 38 0.035 *** 0.7
Rich_Wealth 26 -0.092 *** -1.8
Log Balance 9.77$     -0.063 *** -1.2
New Entrant 11 0.342 *** 6.6
Plan Design (%)
SA_Before 61 0.880 *** 16.9
Co. Stock Offered 26 0.1011 *** 1.9
Loan Offered 59 -0.0304 -0.6
N Funds 38.9 -0.0112 *** -0.2
Controls
Participant Clustering Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes
Industry Fixed Effect Yes
Observations 3,178,373
Number of Clusters 252,980
-2LogL 2,692,640
Pseudo-R Squared 11.62%  
 
Notes: The model is a Probit regression of lifecycle adoption using the full sample of over 250,000 participants.  It 
controls for how lifecycle funds were introduced (“lifecycle treatment”), demographic control variables for 
participants (“socioeconomic factors”), and elements of plan design that vary at the firm level (“plan design).  
Reference categories include middle income; middle wealth; female (missing variables are dummied). Models 
include participant clustering within plans, and time and industry fixed effects.  ** Significant at the .05 level; *** 
Significant at the .01 level.  
 Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Table 4.  Marginal Effects from Multinomial Logit Model of the Probability of Being a 
Pure or Mixed Lifecycle (LC) Adopter  
(Reference Group: Non adopter; Pure adopters = 8.6%, Mixed adopters 7.7%) 
 
  
Mean
Lifecycle Treatment
Default (%) 10 5.0 *** 1.6 ***
Default*New Entrant 1.6 *** -1.0 ***
Time Count 8.6 0.4 *** -0.1 ***
Time Count Squared 120.7 0.0 *** 0.0 ***
Socioeconomic Characteristics  (%)
Young 24 0.9 *** 0.5 ***
Old 16 -0.5 *** -0.7 ***
Male 43 -0.9 *** -0.2 ***
Low_Income 20 0.2 ** -0.3 ***
High_Income 39 -0.2 0.0
Poor_Wealth 38 0.5 *** 0.0
Rich_Wealth 25 -0.8 *** -0.4 ***
Log Balance 9.80$    -0.7 *** 0.0 **
New Entrant 11 2.1 *** 1.5 ***
Plan Design  (%)
SA_Before 57 3.8 *** 5.0 ***
Co. Stock Offered 31 -1.6 *** 1.2 ***
Loan Offered 61 -1.2 *** 0.4 ***
N funds 37.6 -0.1 *** 0.0 ***
Controls
Participant Clustering Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effext Yes Yes
Observations 3,178,373 3,178,373
Number of Clusters 252,980 252,980
-2LogL 3,354,106 3,354,106
Pseudo-R Squared 15.34% 15.34%
Marginal Effect (%)Marginal Effect (%)
Pure Adopter Mixed Adopter
 
 
 
Notes: The model is a multinomial Logit regression of lifecycle adoption using the full sample of over 250,000 
participants.  It compares mixed adopters (those holding lifecycle funds with other funds) and pure adopters (those 
holding only one lifecycle fund) versus all other participants who do not adopt lifecycle funds (the reference group 
for the dependent variable).  See Table 3 for additional information on the independent variables.  ** Significant at 
the .05 level; *** Significant at the .01 level.  
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Table 5. Contribution Allocations and Portfolio Risk/Return Characteristics Pre/Post 
Introduction of Lifecycle Funds  
(Difference-in-Difference Sample) 
 
A. Contribution Allocations (%) 
Cash 
(MMkt, 
GIC) Bonds
Balanced, 
Lifecycle 
U.S. 
Equities
Int'l 
Equities
Company 
Stock
All Adopters Pre 7.1 5.2 54.2 27.9 2.9 2.7
 Post 3.7 3.6 66.1 21.7 2.7 2.3
 Change -3.4 -1.7 11.9 -6.2 -0.3 -0.4
Pure Adopters Pre 4.9 2.9 79.4 11.3 0.9 0.5
Post 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Change -4.9 -2.9 20.6 -11.3 -0.9 -0.5
Mixed Adopters Pre 8.7 7.0 34.7 40.8 4.5 4.3
Post 6.5 6.3 39.8 38.6 4.8 4.0
Change -2.2 -0.7 5.1 -2.2 0.2 -0.3  
 
 
B. Portfolio Risk/Return Characteristics (%) 
 
Equity 
Alloca-
tions
Syste-
matic 
Returns
NSR/TV*
All Adopters Pre 66.6 6.46 13.8
Post 68.1 6.70 10.0
Change 1.4 0.24 -3.8
Pure Adopters Pre 61.4 6.38 6.0
Post 62.4 6.63 0.9
Change 1.0 0.25 -5.0
Mixed Adopters Pre 70.7 6.52 19.9
Post 72.5 6.76 17.1
Change 1.8 0.24 -2.8  
 
Notes: * Nonsystematic risk as a percent of total variance (see text). Equity allocations are the percentage of 
contributions invested in U.S. or international equities (including equity funds and the equity portfolio of balance, 
lifecycle and other hybrid funds).  Systematic returns refer to excess factor returns relative to the risk-free rate (see 
text).  Non-systematic risk is the idiosyncratic or non-market risk borne by investors (the portion due to deviating 
from a market index portfolio).   
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Table 6.  Marginal Effects from Multivariate Model of Portfolio Equity Allocations (%; 
Difference-in-Difference Sample) 
 
Treatment
LC_treat -0.018 *** -0.032 *** -0.006 -0.013 **
LC_treat*Young 0.064 *** 0.043 ***
LC_treat*Old -0.040 *** -0.035 ***
LC_treat*Low_Income 0.000 0.004
LC_treat*High_Income -0.004 0.000
LC_treat*Male -0.016 *** -0.008 ***
LC_treat*Poor_Wealth 0.019 *** 0.007
LC_treat*Rich_Wealth -0.008 0.008
Socioeconomic Factors
Young 0.006 *** 0.022 *** 0.052 *** 0.031 ***
Old -0.105 *** -0.085 *** -0.078 *** -0.060 ***
Male 0.010 ** 0.019 *** 0.019 *** 0.023 ***
Low_Income 0.004 0.004 -0.015 *** -0.017 ***
High_Income 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.007
Poor_Wealth 0.007 -0.005 -0.012 *** -0.016 ***
Rich_Wealth 0.010 ** 0.013 ** 0.005 0.001
Log Balance 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 ***
Plan Design
SA_Before -0.061 *** -0.062 *** 0.005 0.004
Co.Stock Offered -0.006 -0.004 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
Loan Offered 0.074 *** 0.074 *** 0.011 0.011
N Funds 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 0.000 0.000
Controls
Participant-level clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 21,500 21,500 27,724 27,724
# of Participants 10,750 10,750 13,862 13,862
R Squared 0.19 0.20 0.06 0.06
Dependent Means (%)         
Pre-treat 61.4 70.7
Post-treat 62.4 72.5
Unadjusted difference 1.0 1.8
Model A Model B Model A Model B
Mixed AdoptersPure Adopters
 
Note: The model is an OLS regression based on the difference-in-difference sample of lifecycle investors.  The 
model regresses portfolio equity allocations on a variety of treatment, socioeconomic and plan-level characteristics.  
Clustering and fixed effects are as described in Table 3.   
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Table 7.  Marginal Effects of Multivariate Model of Lifecycle Treatment on Portfolio Characteristics 
(%; Difference-in-Difference Sample) 
 
 
Treatment
LC_treat 0.0021 *** 0.0019 *** -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.051 *** -0.039 *** -0.083 *** -0.075 ***
LC_treat*Young -0.0006 *** 0.0002 0.010 *** -0.002
LC_treat*Old 0.0006 ** -0.0011 ** -0.023 *** -0.001
LC_treat*Low_Income -0.0002 -0.0003 0.008 *** 0.005
LC_treat*High_Income 0.0000 -0.0005 ** 0.000 0.001
LC_treat*Male 0.0011 *** 0.0000 -0.039 *** -0.013 ***
LC_treat*Poor_Wealth 0.0005 *** 0.0003 -0.009 *** -0.011 ***
LC_treat*Rich_Wealth -0.0007 *** 0.0009 *** 0.009 *** 0.003
Socioeconomic Factors
Young 0.0005 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0014 *** 0.000 -0.005 *** 0.004 0.004
Old -0.0195 *** -0.0023 *** -0.0017 *** -0.0012 *** 0.007 *** 0.018 *** 0.005 0.006
Male 0.0001 -0.0004 ** 0.0010 *** 0.0010 *** 0.001 0.021 *** 0.002 0.009 **
Low_Income 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.002 -0.006 ** 0.010 *** 0.008
High_Income 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 0.004
Poor_Wealth 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0006 *** -0.0007 *** -0.002 0.003 -0.014 *** -0.009 **
Rich_Wealth 0.0002 ** 0.0005 *** 0.0001 -0.0003 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005
Log Balance 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 ***
Plan Design
SA_Before 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0009 *** -0.074 *** -0.075 *** -0.055 *** -0.055 ***
CS_Offer 0.0001 0.0001 0.0032 *** 0.0032 *** 0.035 *** 0.034 *** 0.068 *** 0.067 ***
Loan_Offer 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0001 0.0001 -0.009 *** -0.007 *** -0.006 -0.006
Nfund 0.0001 *** 0.0001 *** 0.0000 ** 0.0000 0.000 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 **
Observations 21,500 21,500 27,724 27,724 21,500 21,500 27,724 27,724
# of Participants 10,750 10,750 13,862 13,862 10,750 10,750 13,862 13,862
R Squared 14.4% 14.8% 35.6% 35.6% 27.7% 29.2% 30.9% 31.0%
Dependent means
Pre-treat 6.38% 6.52% 6.0% 19.9%
Post-treat 6.63% 6.76% 0.9% 17.1%
Unadjusted difference 0.25% 0.24% -5.0% -2.8%
A B A
Returns Idiosyncratic Risk Share (NSR/TV)*
B
 Pure Adopters Mixed Adopters  Pure Adopters Mixed Adopters
 A B A B
 
Note: * refers to the ratio of nonsystematic portfolio variance to total variance; see text and Table 6 for details. 
 
29 
 
Figure 1.  Change in Equity Proportion After Lifecycle Fund Introduction: Patterns by 
Age for Pure and Mixed Adopters (Difference-in-Difference Sample) 
 
   
Pure Adopters   Mixed Adopters 
3% 3%
-3%
-1%
-7%
-5%
10%
8%
-13%
-8%
-3%
2%
7%
12%
Young (< 35) Middle age (35-55) Older (> 55) |Old - Young|
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Figure 2.  Equity Allocations of Lifecycle Adopters: Before and After Adoption  
Difference-in-Difference Sample 
 
 
 
 
Note: No SA (static allocation funds) were offered prior to LC introduction. 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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Appendix.  Cross-sectional Variation in Equity Exposure  
(%; Difference-in-Difference Sample) 
 
 
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
No SA before
     Before 64.2 0.34 71.8 0.28 68.0 0.31
     After 62.8 0.16 72.6 0.19 67.7 0.18
     % Change -2 -53 1 -32 -1 -42
SA before
     Before 60.9 0.22 70.6 0.23 66.4 0.23
     After 62.4 0.19 72.5 0.21 68.2 0.21
     % Change 2 -14 3 -9 3 -9
All adopters
     Before 61.4 0.24 70.7 0.24 66.6 0.24
     After 62.4 0.18 72.5 0.20 68.1 0.20
     % Change 2 -25 3 -17 2 -17
    Pure adopters    Mixed adopters      All adopters
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
 
